Output details
11 - Computer Science and Informatics
University of Cambridge
Output title
Baggy Bounds Checking: An Efficient and Backwards-Compatible Defense against Out-of-Bounds Errors.
Type
E - Conference contribution
DOI
-
Name of conference/published proceedings
USENIX Security Symposium
Volume number
-
Issue number
-
First page of article
51
ISSN of proceedings
-
Year of publication
2009
Number of additional authors
3
Additional information
<19> USENIX Security Symposium is one of the top-tier security conferences. This paper describes a new way to tackle an old problem: run-time bounds checking of non type-safe (unmanaged) code to prevent bugs and exploits. The key idea is to trade off space overhead (by rounding up allocations to the nearest power of two) for a reduction in run-time checking complexity, all without changing the pointer size (which means the technique is backward compatible with existing code and libraries). The evaluation shows the system works effectively and efficiently.
Interdisciplinary
-
Cross-referral requested
-
Research group
None
Citation count
-
Proposed double-weighted
No
Double-weighted statement
-
Reserve for a double-weighted output
No
Non-English
No
English abstract
-
