Output details
11 - Computer Science and Informatics
Teesside University
Output title
Mechanisms for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with a few distinct goods
Type
E - Conference contribution
DOI
-
Name of conference/published proceedings
Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Volume number
-
Issue number
-
First page of article
691
ISSN of proceedings
-
Year of publication
2013
Number of additional authors
2
Additional information
<22> This recent work won Best Paper prize for AAMAS 2013, out of 612 submissions, and has been invited, as spotlight talk, to AAAI 2013 and to a special JAIR track for award-winning papers from selected AI conferences. Combinatorial Auctions (CAs) is the paradigmatic problem in mechanism design showing the tension between computer science and economics. The techniques developed in the two disciplines seem inadequate to design a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that guarantees best possible approximation for CAs and is part of a truthful mechanism. This paper shows that this is not the case when the items on sale are few.
Interdisciplinary
-
Cross-referral requested
-
Research group
None
Citation count
-
Proposed double-weighted
No
Double-weighted statement
-
Reserve for a double-weighted output
No
Non-English
No
English abstract
-
