Output details
11 - Computer Science and Informatics
Teesside University
Output title
Using lotteries to approximate the optimal revenue
Type
E - Conference contribution
DOI
-
Name of conference/published proceedings
Proceedings of the 2013 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Volume number
-
Issue number
-
First page of article
643
ISSN of proceedings
-
Year of publication
2013
URL
Number of additional authors
1
Additional information
<22> Online markets, including Google’s sponsored search auctions and Apple’s iTunes store, generate turnover of billions of pounds. However, the deployed systems are non-truthful (i.e., users can play the system) and designed to maximize social welfare (i.e., the happiness of the users) rather than revenue. In this work we prove that there are simple auctions, based on the idea of selling lottery tickets to win goods, which are collusion-resistant (and then cannot be played even by coalitions of users exchanging side payments) and approximate the optimal revenue within the best factor achievable by any truthful auction.
Interdisciplinary
-
Cross-referral requested
-
Research group
None
Citation count
-
Proposed double-weighted
No
Double-weighted statement
-
Reserve for a double-weighted output
No
Non-English
No
English abstract
-
