Output details
32 - Philosophy
University of Oxford
Article title
Aristotele e i paralogismi dell'identità
Type
D - Journal article
DOI
-
Title of journal
Rivista di Storia della Filosofia
Article number
-
Volume number
63
Issue number
2
First page of article
205
ISSN of journal
0393-2516
Year of publication
2008
URL
-
Number of additional authors
0
Additional information
-
Interdisciplinary
-
Cross-referral requested
-
Research group
None
Proposed double-weighted
No
Double-weighted statement
-
Reserve for a double-weighted output
No
Non-English
Yes
English abstract
In his Sophistical Refutations Aristotle introduces a fallacy “due to accident” which has attracted scholarly attention because it hinges on problems concerning identity remarkably akin to modern puzzles of referential opacity. Aristotle, however, attempts to describe the fallacy in several apparently diverging ways, and even though he provides many examples, these look so heterogeneous that it is hard to see why they should belong to the same pattern. The paper addresses these problems by identifying a general rationale for the fallacy, reconstructing most of the examples from Aristotle’s sketchy descriptions, and showing that they fit the suggested pattern.
